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HISTORICALLY the concept of treason was evolved by legislatures and courts
in order to protect the state from those domestic activities which threaten its
destruction. Fear of the potential misapplication of the doctrine to the area of
legitimate partisan conflict led to the enactment of legislation which specifies
in precise terms the proscribed activities, establishes definite intent require-
ments, and provides special procedural and evidentiary safeguards for the
trials of alleged traitors. The inadequacies of such traditional legislation to
cope effectively with postwar demands of embittered populations for punish-
ment of the huge number of wartime collaborators' in Anglo-American and
European countries have produced significant developments in the legal tech-
niques utilized to safeguard national security and to punish violators thereof.
Prior to 1939 the major threat to national wartime security appeared to
stem from the actual rendering of military assistance by citizens to the
enemy; consequently pre-war European legislation was'substantially focused
on this single aspect of treason. However, such a delimitation of the concept
failed to anticipate the emphasis by belligerents in World War II on the use
of fifth columnists and psychological warfare; nor did it provide a defense
against threats to industrial potential or to homefront morale. In addition,
political tensions which developed as an incident to war combined in the post-
war period to produce a climate of opinion within which the problem of pun-
ishment of wartime collaborators was raised from the level of legalistic "secu-
rity" to the bitterly contested level of domestic politics.
The extent to which domestic treason laws were invoked to deal with col-
1. Reliable figures on the number of collaborators are still unavailable for many coun-
tries. In Denmark, immediately following the liberation, 22,000 suspected collaborators
were apprehended. Givskov, The Danish Purge Trials (unpublished manuscript, 1946). In
Norway, by the end of 1946, 54,000 out of the 75,000 persons accused of treason had been
tried. Of these, 22,000 cases were dropped and 32,000 persons were found guilty. Politiken
(Danish Liberal Daily), March 1, 1947. Estimates placed the number of Dutch collabora-
tors at 18,000, while in Belgium a government official stated that 60,000 collaborators had
been arrested in the first year of liberation and that as of June, 1945, 16,959 cases had been
tried. N. Y. Times, March 17, 1946, p. 19, col. 2; Vermeylen, The Punishment of Collabora-
tors, 247 ANNALS 73, 75 (1946). Five hundred Swiss citizens were reported to have engaged
in treasonous activities during the war, and in France, 125,000 collaboration cases were re-
ported as of July, 1946. See note 103 infra. Seventy-five collaborators were tried in Great
Britain and only about ten in the United States. Those tried in the United States were
charged either with assistance rendered to German saboteurs.or with having broadcast
abroad in the service of the Axis governments. The outstanding treason trial in the
United States concerned Anthony Cramer, a member of the first group. See Cramer v.
United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1944).
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laborators differs among the various countries in accordance with the rigidity
or flexibility of the national treason concepts and the intensity of popular de-
mands. In general, the majority of the countries broadened their substantive
treason provisions to interdict transmission abroad of industrial, economic and
political information, and to prohibit activities which tended to weaken civil-
ian support of the war effort. After the termination of war, ordinary criminal
courts were frequently supplemented or superseded by the establishment of
quasi-political courts2 or by military tribunals ;3 substantive treason provisions
were amended by specific legislation,4 or were broadened by judicial legisla-
tion to modify earlier intent requirements and to include within their orbit
political collaboration; and, finally, special laws were enacted to punish less
serious offenders by administrative sanctions involving loss of civil rights, or
loss of the right to engage in certain occupations or professions, or to hold
certain types of public office."
It is the purpose of this comment to analyze the treason laws and the col-
laboration trials conducted in pursuance thereto in Great Britain, Svitzerland,
and France, which have been selected as representative of the active Allied
belligerents, the neutral powers, and the liberated countries of western Eu-
rope. The major developments in domestic treason laws will be explored, and
the extent to which local collaboration problems were influential in this evolu-
tion will be indicated. Finally a preliminary effort will be made to evaluate
the techniques employed to effectuate new governmental policies.
GRE-AT B=rrAiN
In comparison with France and Switzerland, the number of British subjects
prosecuted in Great Britain for wartime activities regarded as inimical to na-
tional security was relatively small. This may in part be explained by the fact
that Great Britain, although an active belligerent, was neither invaded nor oc-
cupied by enemy forces. Thus not only was her belligerent status a strong
2." This was the solution adopted by France. See notes 84-5 infra, and by Denmark,
see Givskov, op. cit. supra note 1.
3. Belgium utilized her regular military courts but changed their composition to in-
clude two civil magistrates, Vermeylen, supra note 1, at 75. In Holland special courts
were created composed of three civilian barristers and two military advisers. News Digest
(England) Dec. 21, 1944, No. 1640, p. 20. Note also the extensions of the jurisdiction of
military courts to civilians charged with treason in Great Britain and Switzerland, notes
26 and 51 infra.
4. Although France and Switzerland had amended their treason laws prior to the
outbreak of the war, The Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium and Sweden were forced to
amend their laws retroactively after war had broken out.
5. See, for example, the decision of the English court in the trial of William Joyce,
notes 29 and 31 infra.
6. See French decree on national indignity, note 67 infra. The Norwegian law is
summarized in News Digest (England) May 16, 1945, No. 1760, p. 18. For Dutch provi-
sions, see Id., Feb. 17, 1945, No. 1704, p. 3S. Belgian provisions are reported by Vermey-
len, supra note 1, at 77.
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unifying factor, but, in addition, the freedom of her citizens from contact
with the enemy as reinforced by British trading with the enemy legislation
reduced the possibilities and temptations of wide-scale assistance to the enemy.
As of April, 1946, British authorities had apprehended 125 alleged collabo-
rators, 50 of whom were subsequently released without trial. 7 These persons
were chiefly British civilians who had been resident abroad during the war
and British servicemen who had been taken prisoner by the enemy. The col-
laborationist activities with which they were charged involved the divulgence
of military information to the enemy and. participation in the enemy propa-
ganda service. To defend itself against this group, Great Britain invoked both
its treason law and, for less serious offenses, its Defense of the Realm Regu-
lations.
Britsh Treason Law. The first British treason statute, enacted in 1351,8
classifiedthe crime of treason into three types of activities: plotting the King's
death, levying war against the King, and adhering to the King's enemies by
giving them aid and comfort. The statute provided a mandatory penalty of
death upon conviction. With the development of the national state and the
proportional diminution of the sovereign's power, the crime of treason was
interpreted as applicable to acts endangering the security of the state as well
as the person of the King.9 The first two sections of the basic statute were
said to encompass acts endangering the internal security of the body
politic,10 and it was therefore the third section which was generally invoked
against wartime traitors.1"
The act of adherence to the King's enemies had been judicially determined
to embrace any act committed at home or abroad 12 which was intentionally
designed to render direct military assistance to the enemy.' 3 It included there-
7. The Times' (London), April 12, 1946, p. 8, col. 4. With the exception of the trial
of William Joyce, the complete reports of the proceedings against these collaborators are
not available. Summaries of the charges and findings of the courts are contained in
ROBERTS, TRIAL OF WILLIAM JOYCE 172 et seq. (1946).
8. 25 Edw. III Stat. 5 c. 2.
9. This development received judicial recognition in' Rex v. Maclane, 26 How. St.
Tr. 722 (1797).
10. These sections were invoked extensively during the turbulent Stuart period. With
the stabilization of the English political regime they fell into relative disuse. For an ex-
cellent analysis of the treason trials which occurred under these sections prior to 1790,
see Brief for United States on reargument, pp. 55-170, Craner v. United States, 325 U.S.
1 (1944).
11. This branch of the statute had not been utilized to any great extent prior to the
19th century. 2 STEPHEN', HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 282 (1883) ; see also
8 HOLDsWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 307 (5th ed. 1937).
12. The statute of 1351 was first interpreted to apply to acts of treason committed
abroad in Rex v. Casement [1917] 1 KB. 98.
13. Rex v. Casement, supra note 12 (incitement of Irish prisoners of war to join the
Irish Brigade sponsored by Germany and participation in a "warlike and hostile expedi-
tion to Ireland with intent to invade Great Britain.") ; Rex v. Ahlers [1915] 1 K.B, 616
(assisting German subjects of military age to return to Germany; acquitted on other
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fore enlistment in the enemy forces, incitement of British soldiers to deser-
tion, and the furnishing of military information to the enemy.1 4 It w-as con-
sidered immaterial for the purposes of conviction whether the aid sought to be
rendered was in fact of any assistance to the enemy. In contrast to both
Swiss'9 and French' 6 law, British treason law by 1939 had not expressly been
adjudicated as embracing activities directed primarily towards the weakening
of the resistance power of the civilian population. 7
The treason act of 1351 has been consistently interpreted to require proof
of both intent and an overt act as prerequisites to conviction.18 The principle
underlying these requirements, as emphasized by the British jurists in the 16th
and 17th centuries, was a desire to limit the broad field of treason and to pre-
vent its extension to acts which did not in fact involve a breach of faith or a
violation of allegiance to the King.'9 Although these jurists were primarily
concerned with the potential abuse of the first two sections of the treason act
as a weapon against general political activity, British courts have consistently
applied the same strict intent and overt act requirements to the crime of ad-
grounds) ; Rex v. Lynch [19031 1 K.B. 444 (taking oath of allegiance to Orange Free
State during Boer War, incitement of Irish prisoners of war to assist the enemy, com-
manding an Irish division with intent to cooperate with the Boer army) ; Rex v. Gregg,
14 How. St. Tr. 1371 (170S) (sending letter of intelligence to enemy); Trial of Capt.
Vaughan, 13 How. St. Tr. 486 (1696) (cruising in French warship with intent to capture
English ships while France and England were at war); Trial of Sir Richard Grahme,
12 How. St. Tr. 645 (1691) (boarding a ship destined for France allegedly carrying pa-
pers containing a plan for the invasion of England).
Various statutes passed from time to time explicitly defining acts prohibited under
this branch of the statute bear out the concept of the statute as prohibiting acts of an
essentially military nature. 3 Wim. and Mary c. 13 (1691) (prohibiting as treason the
sending of arms, powder, bullets and other war materials to France); 9 Will. III, c. 1
(1697) (prohibiting as treason any correspondence with the late King James and his ad-
herents); and compare the Treachery Act, 1940, 3 & 4 Geo. VI, c. 21, which provides
that "if with the intent to help the enemy, any person does, or attempts ... to do, any
act which is designed or likely to give assistance to the naval, military or air operations
of the enemy, to impede such operations of His Majesty's forces ... he shall be guilty
of [treason]... :'
14. Rex v. Casement, [1917] 1 K.B. 98; Rex v. Gregg, supra note 13; Trial of Capt.
Vaughan, supra note 13.
15. See note 44 infra.
16. See note 70 infra.
17. However, frequent dicta in British treason cases indicate that the statute was re-
garded as embracing any act intended to weaken the power of the British population to
resist or to attack the enemy. See Rex v. Casement, [1917] 1 K.B. 98; Rex v. Lynch,
[1903] 1 K.B. 444.
18. However, these overt act requirements were modified in cases involving plots
against the life of the King. For such an indictment, proof of the conspiracy alone was
often sufficient even without further evidence of overt acts. See Brief for United States
on reargument, pp. 159 et seq., Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1944).
19. CorE, INSTITTrES OF LAws OF ENGLAND, THmi PAR 2-3, 21-2 (1644) ; 1 HALr,
HisroRy OF PLEAs OF rH CROWN 86 (Emlyn ed. 1736).
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herence to the'King's enemies.-s Trials were conducted before the ordinary
criminal courts, but in view of the serious nature of the crime, it was required
that defendants be supplied before trial with a list of the jurors and that two
witnesses testify to the overt acts charged in the indictment.21 This special
procedure was abandoned in 1800 for the crime of compassing the King's
death2 and in 1940 for all trials involving the rendering of military assistance
to the enemy.23 Finally, in 1945, after the apprehension of William Joyce in
Germany, Parliament assimilated procedurally all treason trials to those of
ordinary felonies.
24
The use of military courts for the trial of treason had been confined histori-
cally in England to cases involving members of the armed forces.2 5 However,
under the Treachery Act of 1940 their jurisdiction was extended to embrace
treasonous activities of alien enemies if committed within the United King-
dom.
26
British Action Against Collaborators. Of the 75 British subjects charged
with wartime assistance to the enemy, seven were indicted for high treason,
and the balance were prosecuted for offenses against the Defense Regulations.
Under these regulations, 27 ". . . any persons who with intent to assist the
enemy committed an act which was likely to assist the enemy or to prejudice
the public safety, the defense of the realm, or the efficient prosecution of the
war . . ." were subject to a maximum penalty of penal servitude for life.
20. For a modern case in which the court refused to infer a treasonable intent, see
Rex v. Ahlers [1915] 1 K.B. 616. In that case, the court acquitted the defendant who,
while acting under a misapprehension of his duty as German consul in Liverpool, had as-
sisted German citizens of military age to return to Germany after the outbreak of the
war.
21. 7 & 8 Will. III, c. 3 (1695).
22. 39 & 40 Geo. III, c. 93 (1800). According to this statute, attempts on the life of
the King were to be tried in the same manner as ordinary felonies.
23. The Act provided that all persons rendering direct assistance to the military op-
erations of the enemy, impeding operations of the British forces, or committing acts of
sabotage which endangered life, could be tried for treachery rather than for treason under
the Act of 1351. Indictments for treachery were to be determined in the same manner as
ordinary criminal indictments. In this manner the special procedures required for treason
indictments were circumvented. Treachery Act, 1940, 3 & 4 Geo. VI, c. 21. See note 26
nfra.
24. Treason Bill, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. VI, c. 44. For explanation of the legislative intent
see 411 H.L. DEB. 1394-8 (5th ser. 1945).
25. The 14aval Discipline Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. V, c. 37; The Army and Air Force
(Annual) Act, 1929, 19 Geo. V, c. 20; The Air Force Act, 1930, 17 HALsDURY's COM-
PLETE STATUTES OF ENGLAND 306 (Butterworth ed. 1930).
26. Treachery Act, 1940, 3 & 4 Geo. VI, c. 21. Three reasons were advanced for
passing this statute: to enable the trial of enemy aliens who may not have established resi-
dence inGreat Britain; to avoid the procedural requirements attached to treason trials by
criminal courts; and to permit the joinder of treason charges with lesser offenses. 361 H.C.
Dim. 185-229 (5th ser. 1940). The phrase "endangering life" was included to assure the
possibility of including acts of sabotage within the crime of treason if so desired. bid.
27. Defense (General) Regulations, S.R. & 0., 1939, No. 927, §2A.
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The precise factors which determined the treasonous character of the acts
engaged in are not clear, but appear to include the intent and motives of the
actor, the sufficiency of the available evidence and the degree of assistance
rendered the enemy.
28
Three of the seven defendants indicted for treason had engaged in propa-
ganda activities on behalf of the German Government through the medium of
the radio and the political pamphlet. In the trial of William Joyce, the suffi-
ciency of broadcasting for the enemy as an act of adherence was presented to
British courts for the first time. Unfortunately, at the trial this issue was
completely overshadowed in the arguments of counsel by the jurisdictional
question of whether a non-resident alien holding a British passport could com-
mit treason abroad.29 Defense counsel, in his summation, attempted to limit
the treason potential of broadcasting in terms of the nature of the information
broadcast.30 The jury's verdict of guilty, however, appears in effect a finding
that the mere act of broadcasting over an enemy network constitutes an act of
adherence to the King's enemies, even though the falsity of the propaganda is
clearly evident to listeners.31 Subsequent trials in Great Britain indicate that
the treasonous nature of propaganda activities on behalf of the enemy is not
dependent either on the financial reward to the defendant or on the medium of
dissemination
32
As has been noted above, British treason law required that the Crown prove
the existence of an intent on the part of the accused to assist the enemy. In
the case of Joyce, the question of intent was not argued by the parties and the
court in its instructions to the jury stated that the jury must determine for it-
28. See note 9 supra. See also remarks of British Attorney General with regard to
the evidentiary difficulties in prosecuting the collaborators for high treason. 363 H.C.
DER. 41, 1246 (5th ser. 1940) ; 365 id. 1236.
29. The sole evidence introduced by the Crown consisted of the testimony of a British
police inspector that he had heard Joyce broadcast that Dover and Folkestone had been
totally destroyed by air raids, and of a workbook issued by the Germans in which the
fact of Joyce's employment by the German Propaganda Service .as recorded. HALL,
Tans OF oVnzLiAm Jorcz 65 ct seq. (1946). The legal effect of this testimony ,,was only
touched upon in the summations of the prosecution and defense. Id. at 209 ct seq.
30. Id. at 209.
31. Id. at 223.
32. Walter Purdy was convicted of treason (subsequently reprieved) for having made
records for German broadcasts, prepared pamphlets for distribution as enemy propaganda
and served in an SS corps. The Times (London) Dec. 19, 1945, p. 2, col. 2. Thomas
Haller Cooper, convicted of treason (subsequently reprieved), had been charged with hav-
ing fought in a WVaffen SS division in Russia and with having subsequently returned to
Germany and written two pamphlets at the request of the German Foreign Office for dis-
tribution to English prisoners of war. RoBERTS, op. cit. supra note 7, at 182. John Amery,
whose confession resulted in his execution, had not been employed in any capacity by the
German government. His offense consisted in having made frequent speeches to prisoners
of war and internees in Belgium and Holland urging the conclusion of a peace between
Germany and England in order to enable these countries to unite in opposition to the ad-
vance of Communism in Europe. Id. at 175.
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self whether the purpose of Joyce's broadcasts in English was to assist the
Germans or the English, implying that the necessary intent can be inferred
from acts of the accused.33 And, in the trial of William Purdy,84 the court,
while reaffirming the necessity of establishing criminal intent, stated that, inas-
much as a man must be presumed to have intended the consequences of his
act, the burden was on the accused to prove that he had a different intention. 5
It would appear, therefore, that in the treason trials of 1945-6 British courts
have substantially modified the common law doctrine of ifitent.
SWITZERLAND
Surrounded on three sides by opposing belligerents, populated by French,
Italian and German speaking groups, many of whom were domiciled aliens or
political refugees, dependent on the external world for raw materials, and
faced with a continuous propaganda barrage from all belligerents, Switzer-
land was confronted with serious threats to its neutrality and independence.
Prominent in sowing the seeds of disunity were the German alien groups and
the'Swiss Rightist parties, which espoused National Socialism and advocated
close cooperation or even anschwsas with the German Reich. 0
As early as 1932, the Germans domiciled in Switzerland formed themselves
into organizations patterned after those of the German Nazi party.1 They pub-
33. HALL, op. cit. supra note 29, at 223.
34. Purdy, charged among other things with broadcasting for the Germany Radio
Service, defended on the ground that his purpose had been to win his freedom from the
prisoner of war camp in which he had been confihed and thus escape to Great Britain,
and also to give weather information to the Royal Air Forces. The court apparently re-
garded the purpose of escape as a mere act of self-assistance and not sufficiently merltorI-
ous to justify the offense, but instructed the jury that a verdict of not guilty should be re-
turned if Purdy had honestly intended to convey information to the R.A.F. The argu-
ments of counsel and the instructions of the judge are fully summarized in Note, 10
J. CGrm. L. 182 (1946).
35. Purdy was sentenced to death but was granted a reprieve. The effect of this re-
prieve on the ruling of the court is not clear. If ordered by the Crown, no reason need
be assigned. However, if granted by the trial court, it would indicate either the dissatig-
faction of the judge with the verdict, the insufficiency of the indictment, or the existence
of certain favorable circumstances in the defendant's character which convinced the court
that time should be extended to him to apply to the Crown for an absolute or conditional
pardon. See WHARToN's LAW LExICON 870 (14th ed., 1938) ; ARCHBOLD, PLEADINO, EVI-
DENCE AND PPAcrIcE. IN CRIMINAL CASEs 204 (31st ed. 1943).
36. The material which follows on the organization and purposes of the German alien
groups and extreme Rightist parties in Switzerland is based on Part 1 of a report recently
issued by the Swiss Federal Council on anti-democratic activities in Switzerland during
the war. Parts 2 and 3 dealt with Fascists and Communists. RAPPORT DU CONSEIL FiD-
I-RAL A L'AssEEmB - FfPDRALE CONCERNANT L'Acrivrrf. Axr-DiMOCRATIQuE E ERcr
PAR LEs SUISSES ET DES P-TRANGERS ON RE:LATION AVEc LA PARIODE Dr Gun= 1939 A
1945 (MoTION BOaLIN) Pt I, Dec. 28, 1945; hereafter cited as RAPPORT.
37. These groups were arranged in a hierarchical organization with the N.S.D.A.P.
Landesgruppe Schweiz at the top. Secondary units included youth clubs, sport and stu-
dent groups, women's associations and the like. As of 1941 membership in these groups
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lished newspapers and disseminated propaganda material sent from Germany
either by courier or through the German diplomatic pouch. Working in close
association with these groups were extreme rightist Swiss political parties,
some of which operated chiefly as propaganda organs, while others supplied
the (German government with general data on the local political, economic and
military situation. After the outbreak of war, the extremist parties were dis-
solved, and many of their leaders fled to Germany to continue their propa-
ganda activities.38
Swiss Treason Legislation. Although these activities were regarded as a
grave threat to Swiss independence and neutrality, their essentially political
nature caused considerable difficulty in the application of Swiss treason lavs.
The Swiss treason law is contained in her penal and military criminal codes
which, in common with continental systems of criminal law, are more precise
and detailed and at the same time more extensive in scope than their British
counterparts. The provisions of the Swiss treason law which relate to the ex-
ternal security of the country also differ from those of Great Britain in that
they apply both in times of peace and war.
Up to 1942, with the exception of certain amendments noted below, the ap-
plicable Swiss treason law was based on a penal code enacted in 1 8 53.Po In
time of war it was considered high treaton for any Swiss citizen to enlist in
the enemy forces or intentionally to assist the activities of the enemy 40 in
time of peace, it was treasonous for a citizen to attempt to place any part of
Switzerland under the control of a foreign power, to induce foreign powers
to commit hostilities against Switzerland, or to interfere in her internal mat-
ters in a manner calculated to endanger her security.4 ' Finally, it was con-
sidered treasonable in time of peace for any Swiss citizen, in the course of an
illegal act such as theft, to give intentional aid to the interests of a foreign
state, and to the prejudice of Switzerland. 2 With regard to internal security,
the Swiss code of 1853 punished as high treason any participation in an act
designed to change the federal constitution by force, forcibly to remove
state officials designated by the constitution, or to deprive them of their au-
totalled 25,000. The total German and Austrian population in Switzerland was reparted
as 78,000 as of 1941 although it is not clear whether this figure included political refugees.
The leaders of these groups took an oath of loyalty to Hitler and received their orders
either from the German legation in Bern or directly from Berlin.
38. Those in Germany contributed frequent articles to the German press denouncing
Switzerland for her unneutral attitude, attacking Swiss officials and the Swiss pieople as
"degenerate plutocratic Jewish Freemasons" and encouraging Swiss Nazis who remained
at home to continue their efforts in behalf of National Socialism. Neue Zuercher Zeitung
(Zurich), July 9, 1946, No. 1221, Col. 3. Many Swiss worked for German occupation au-
thorities. Le Figaro (Paris), April 23, 1945.
39. (1851-3) RwcuU.m Orncir. 3, 335; hereafter cited as C.P.S., 1853.
40. C.P.S., 1853, §§ 36-7.
41. C.P.S., 1853, § 37.
42. C.P.S., 1853, § 38.
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thority.4 3 In 1936, this code was broadened to inderdict attempts by non-
citizens to place a portion of Swiss territory under foreign control, and to
provide that any citizen or foreigner who committed an act tending to en-
danger the independence of the confederation should be guilty of treason.44
In 1942 the new Swiss penal code, which had been promulgated in 1937, be-
came effective. 45 This code reproduced substantially the 1853 treason pro-
visions as amended in 1936 and added certain new provisions under the head-
ing of "diplomatic treason." By virtue of these additions, it became treason-
able for any citizen or foreigner to reveal to a foreign government or to its
agents or to the public any information which it was in the national interest
to keep secret.46 Treason charges under this penal code are triable by ordi-
nary criminal courts and the penalties which may be imposed vary from one
to five years penal servitude.
47
However, in Switzerland, unlike either Great Britain or France, civilians
are also subject to the treason provisions of the military criminal code which
differ in certain respects from those contained in the penal code. Thus under
the Swiss military criminal code of 192748 civilians found guilty of having
obtained secret facts, processes, or articles for the purpose of making these
available to a foreign government were guilty of treason.49 When a state of
"active service" was proclaimed for Switzerland, civilians under this code
were guilty of treason if they intentionally interfered directly or indirectly
with the operations of the Swiss army, either by disrupting its means of com-
munication, by disturbing public order or in any other manner6 0 Under the
military code, various acts of .military espionage engaged in by military per-
sonnel were defined as treason, and by decrees of 1940 and 1942, these provi-
sions were extended to embrace similar activities of civilians.0 ' Violations
of the military code are punishable by Swiss military courts and the applic-
able penalties vary from three to five years penal servitude,"2 except in time
of war5 3 or, since 1940, during a period of active service54 when the death
penalty could be imposed.
Under both the penal and military codes, it is necessary to show that the
43. C.P:S., 1853, § 45.
44. Federal Law of Oct. 8, 1936, (1936) 53 RECUE1L OrriciEL 37.
45. (1938) 54 RECUEIL OrriciEL 781; hereafter cited as C.P.S., 1937.
46. C.P.S., 1937 § 267.
47. C.P.S., 1937 §§ 265-78.
48. Federal Law of June 13, 1927, (1927) 43 RECUEIL OFFICIEL 375; hereafter cited
as C.P.M.
49. C.P.M. §§ 2, 86.
50. C.P.M., §§ 3, 87-91.
51. Federal Council Decree, Aug. 29, 1939, (1939) 40 RECUEIL OFFICI.L 760; Ordi-
nance, May 28, 1940, (1940) 56 RECuEII OFFIciEL 556; Federal Council Decree, Aug. 4,
1942, (1942) 58 RzcuzxL OFFicmL 743.
52. C.P.M. §§ 86-91.
53. C.P.M. §27.
54. Federal Council Decree, Aug. 4, 1942, (1942) 58 RscuEm, OFICiL 743, § 6.
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accused intended to commit the acts defined in the treason provisions. No
special procedural or evidentiary safeguards were established in treason
trials. However, in 1942 certain procedural changes were made in order to en-
able treason proceedings to be conducted in cancra if such a step appeared
necessary to the court in the interest of national security.r At that time it was
also provided that Swiss criminal and military courts could order the preven-
tive detention of persons whose activities appeared to endanger national se-
curity and the internment of those who had been convicted of crimes en-
dangering national security. 6
In addition to these judicial sanctions, certain administrative sanctions
could be imposed on both Swiss citizens and foreigners whose conduct im-
ported a threat to national security even in the absence of conviction for
special offenses. These additional sanctions included the expulsion of for-
eigners either for life or for a stated period,57 and the annulment of the
citizenship of both naturalized s and native-born citizens 0 who had engaged
in "anti-national" activities outside the country. The latter power was en-
acted as an extraordinary war measure to be effective until 1945 and so far
as is known was not renewed after that date.
Swiss Action Against Nazi Elements. Although the 1936 amendment to
the penal code had been enacted with a view to providing a judicial sanction
against the most serious pro-Nazi political activities in Switzerland, the pro-
vision was not invoked prior to the outbreak of the European war.c Legis-
55. (1942) 58 RPcuz. OFFIcim 743.
56. See note 51 supra.
57. Swiss FEDERAL CoxesT. § 70, cited in RAo, SELEcr C NSTITrTIONS OF Tn
,Voar.n 517 (1934).
58. (1941) 57 REcumE. OFFIciEL 1289.
59. EmGEN6SSISSCHE GnsrzSAMrLUNG, No. 21, Bern, May 20, 1943. Reported in-
stances where Swiss citizens were denationalized for undesirable activities abroad reveal
the caution with which this decree was invoked. In two cases the parties affected held
another nationality so that the withdrawal of Swiss nationality did not leave them state-
less. Neue Zurcher Zeitung (Zurich), Dec. 10, 1945, No. 1876; Gazette de Lausanne,
July 14, 1945, No. 176. The denationalization of Max Leo Keller, leader of the National
Beweguog der Schweiz, one of the largest of the Swiss Rightist Parties, was announced
only after his conviction in absentia for military treason. Nationale Zeitung, June 14, 1945.
Proof that the activity was willful and constituted an actual danger to Swiss neutrality
was apparently insisted upon where no prior conviction had been secured. In the case
of Georges Oltramare who had fled to France to work for the occupation authorities,
the Federal Council refused to act on a denaturalization request presented in 1943 on the
ground that his actions at that time had not adversely affected Swiss neutrality. Journal
de Geneve, Oct. 22, 1945, No. 249. Oltramare is now on trial for treason having been
apprehended at the end of the war. Id., April 19-26, 1946, Nos. 92-7.
60. In the case of foreigners, proof of their intermeddling in Swiss affairs was
deemed insufficient to warrant their prosecution for treason, and in the case of Swiss
citizens mere espousal of Nazi doctrine was not considered as a sufficient threat to the
independence of the confederation within the meaning of the amended provision. R/wrowm
4, 9, 15, 18, 26.
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lative and administrative measures were devised during the pre-war period
to enable authorities to maintain a rigid supervision over the activities of
both groups,6' and to control the types of propaganda disseminated.02
During the war, however, Swiss authorities made determined efforts to deal
with approximately 500 Swiss and an indeterminate number of foreigners who
engaged in treasonous activities.63 The majority of those who were indicted
for treason were charged with endangering the military security of the coun-
try by the delivery of military information to foreign powers."s Death
sentences were pronounced in several cases, against both Swiss citizens and
foreigners. Since the termination of hostilities, popular demands for the
punishment of those whose wartime activities were regarded as contrary to
the national interest were directed primarily against alien Nazis and Fascists
in Switzerland. Swiss purge measures instituted to meet this demand in-
volved administrative rather than penal action and were designed to secure
the, e?cp ulsion of those foreigners whose continued presence in Switzerland
was copsidered undesirable.
The only postwar treason trials involving treasonous political activities were
conducted against Swiss citizens who had continued their propaganda on be-
half of National Socialism after the dissolution of the rightist parties.Y0
Charged with the commission of acts tending to endanger the independence
of the confederation, these defendants have pleaded ignorance or lack of
sympathy with the rightist program, lack of intent to threaten Swiss inde-
pendence, and inability to disobey the orders of the group's leaders. Despite
incomplete reports of the trials, it appears that these defenses have been con-
61. The basis for all federal action against alien groups in Switzerland was con-
tained in the directives issued by the Federal Council in Sept. 1935. (1935) 2 F uit=u
FEDERALE 457. These directives, supplemented in 1936 by Federal Council Decree, enabled
Swiss authorities to control some political activities of these groups. (1936) 52 REcuL
OFF ciL 845.
62. Decree of Federal Council, Dec. 5, 1938, (1938) 54 RE-UEmL OmriclL 880. In-
dividual violation of decrees was promptly punished and where foreigners were involved,
their expulsion was ordered.
63. Statement of Deputy in Bern State Council reported in St. Galler Tagblatt (St.
Gallen), Sept. 6, 1945. In some instances trials in absentia were conducted against those
Swiss who were operating from abroad. See report of trial by military court of Major
Laurenz in 1941, La Suisse, Oct. 16, 1945, No. 289; also of Swiss citizen, A. Fuchs, re-
ported in St. Galler Tagblatt (St. Gallen), June 30, 1945; Leonhard and Burri, leaders
of the rightist party, Schweizerisclse Geselischaft fur Aidoriflr Demokratic (SGAD)
were tried in absentia for attempts against the safety of the Confederation and condemned
to five years at hard labor. RAPoRT 61-2.
64. Reports of these trials appeared in the N. Y. Times. See, e.g., id., Feb. 4, 1942,
p. 4, col. 6; id., Feb. 22, 1942, p. 6, col. 2; id., May 3, 1942, p. 32, col. 4; id., Sept. 26, 1942,
p. 4, coL 2; id., April 1, 1943, p. 6, col. 7; id., May 29, 1943, p. 3, col. 7. See also Neue
Zurcher Zeitung (Zurich), May 5, 1943.
65. For reports of these trials, see Neue Zurcher Zeitung (Zurich), July 9, 1946,
No. 12211, ind Easler Nachrichten (Basel), March 20, 1946, No. 120; id., Aug, 19, 1946,
No. 346; id., May 4/5, 1946, No. 184.
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sidered by the courts at least in mitigation of the sentences. The penalties
imposed have varied from short term imprisonment to four-year sentences
accompanied by temporary loss of civil rights or, in a proper case, by military
degradation and expulsion from the army.
On the basis of the available material on the Swiss wartime experience, it is
interesting to note that, although Switzerland was not involved in actual
hostilities during World War II, many of the statutory changes in her pro-
cedural and substantive treason law closely parallel similar changes introduced
into the treason law of Great Britain and the western European countries.
In addition, in at least one respect Swiss law went further than its non-Axis
neighbors by authorizing the denationalization of its citizens for offenses
against national security. With respect to the penal trials, available evidence
indicates an extreme caution on the part of Swiss authorities to invoke their
treason law against those engaging in undesirable political activities. These
trials, moreover, do not suggest any substantial modification of Swiss treason
law with respect to the requirement of proof of treasonable intent.
FRANCE
The great number of French collaborators, estimated at about 125,000, was
partially attributable to the German occupation of France which of necessity
produced frequent contacts between the French citizenry and occupation au-
thorities, and partially to the confusion of loyalties which existed among
Frenchmen as a result of the armistice and the existence of rival governments
in Vichy and London. The collaborators whose punishment was demanded
included leading Vichy government officials and minor civil servants, as well
as ordinary citizens who had in some manner contributed affirmative support
to Vichy policies or had exhibited an anti-national attitude during the war.
Persons who were accused solely of anti-national conduct were dealt with
by administrative purge commissions which had power to exclude them
temporarily from public office or from their professions. 0 On the other
hand, persons who had rendered assistance to the enemy or prejudiced the
unity of the nation or the freedom of the people, but whose activities did not
fall within the scope of the penal laws, were prosecuted by tribunals (chauz-
bres civiques) attached to the purge courts for the offense of national indig-
nity-a crime specially created by the government in August, 1944. T These
66. Purge commissions were set up for: the administrative services of Metropolitan
France, Ordinance of June 26, 1944, (1944) CoLLzcrioN coMPLEiM DE LOIS, Er DaMM
D'iNER-T GENRAL 356 (Sirey, N.S. 1944); architects, Ordinance of Sept. 13, 1945,
Id. No. 19, 458; men of letters, authors and composers, Ordinance of May 30, 1945, Id.
No. 12, 237; professional actors and musicians, Ordinance of Feb. 17, 1945, Id. No. 5,
99; for the press, Ordinance of March 2, 1945, Id. No. 6, 112; doctors, dentists
and midwives, Ordinance of Jan. 18, 1945, Id. No. 3, 67; commerce and industry,
Ordinance of Oct. 16, 1944, Id. 440; banks, Ordinance of Feb. 14, 1945, Id. No.
5, 96; hereafter cited as CoLz.criow Co .PLE.
67. Ordinance of Aug. 26, 1944, (1944) Cou.crboN Co!.Lm'= 385 as amended by Ordi-
nance of Dec. 26, 1944, Id. No. 1-2, 18.
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civic tribunals were empowered to order the total confiscation of the property
of the accused and could in addition permanently deprive defendants of all
civil rights as well as of the right to exercise their professions or to hold cer-
tain official or corporate offices. The most serious offenders were indicted
for treason under the penal laws in force in 1939. The complex nature of
the problems which were encountered by the French Government in these
trials may be attributable to the political disorganization within France after
her liberation, to the large number of persons facing trial and to the difficulty
of applying a French treason law geared to a situation of actual hostilities to
acts committed during a subsequent armistice period.
French Treason Legislation. The French treason provisions, like the
Swiss, are detailed and precise. Prior to 1939,8 it was considered treason
for a Frenchman to bear arms, or to intrigue with a foreign power to com-
mit hostilities against his country.69 It was also treasonous for a Frenchman 0
to intrigue with enemies of the state with intent to facilitate their entrance
into French territory, to furnish them with assistance in soldiers, men, money,
provisions, arms or ammunition, or to weaken the morale of French forces.70
Correspondence with enemy subjects was banned if it furnished information
prejudicial to the military or political situation of France or her allies.71
Finally, any person having official knowledge of a diplomatic secret or expedi-
tion who betrayed it to a foreign power was deemed a traitor.72 Under these
provisions, it is necessary to prove that the defendant intended to commit the
act for the purposes defined in these provisions. An exception to this re-
quirement was made with reference to the act of correspondence with enemy
subjects. It was considered sufficient for conviction of this last offense to
prove that the correspondence in fact resulted in the specified injury to the
military or political situation in France.ra
Barely two months before the outbreak of war in Europe, France revised
and extended this legislation to bring it more in line with the dangers pre-
sented to national security as a result of modern warfare techniques. Un-
doubtedly influenced by the practice of various nations of omitting a formal
declaration of war prior to attack, France abandoned the distinction in her old
law between "enemy" and "foreign" powers and provided that henceforth to
intrigue with any "foreign" power for the purposes specified in the earlier law
68. The French penal code provisions relating to treason prior to 1939 as well as
the amendments introduced in that year can be found in DALLOZ, CODE PfNAL 88 et seq.
(1946); hereafter cited by article number; pre-1939 provisions will be indicated as
C.P. §76 (old), etc.
69. C.P. §76 (old).
70. C.P. §77 (old).
71. C.P. §78 (old).
72. C.P. §80 (old).
73. 3 GARRAuD, DROIT P-NAI, FRANCAIS 521-36 (1916).
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was to be regarded as treason.7 4 Similarly the provision relating to enlist-
ment in the enemy forces was amended to apply to enlistment in the forces of
a foreign power and to the enrollment of such persons on behalf of a foreign
power at war with France.75 The 1939 amendments provided further that
it would be treason for any Frenchman or foreigner to reveal to a foreign
power a secret of "national defense" which was defined generally as military,
political, economic or industrial information. 70 For the first time civilian
sabotage of any instrument of war or any installation or equipment capable
of utilization in the national defense was proscribed as a treasonous act. Sim-
ilarly it was declared to be treason to participate knowingly in any move to
demoralize either the army or the nation for the purpose of injuring the na-
tional defense. 7 All convictions under these laws carried a penalty of death,
although this was not mandatory.
After the liberation of France, some of the members of the Consultative
Provisional Assembly urged that the substantive penal code provisions deal-
ing with treason be amended so as to include certain activities which, al-
though regarded by the people as criminal, did not fall within the scope of
the penal laws. Their members feared that unless provision was made for the
punishment of these activities, individual repression would be substituted
for legal repression. Furthermore, it was argued that the prohibition against
retroactive legislation, while applicable in normal times, should not be in-
voked if it would result in "outraging the national conscience by leaving
unpunished unpardonable crimes against the country.!"8 However, the govern-
ment was unwilling to enact a comprehensive collaboration law and passed in-
stead certain "interpretive" provisions79 which although not formally retroac-
tive would appear in fact to have such effect. It was provided, for example,
that acts which were regarded as prejudicial to an Allied nation at war with
the Axis powers were also to be regarded as an offense against France and
punished accordingly. Similarly, acts committed against the Resistance forces
and others who continued to fight after the armistice were to be punished in
the same manner as offenses committed against regular French troops.
Under the French penal code, it is a complete defense to a major crime if
the .defendant acted pursuant to a law or to the orders of a legitimate author-
ity.8 0 However, under the "interpretive" provisions this doctrine of superior
74. C.P. § 77. In addition, the amendments provided that in time of war, it would
be treasonous to intrigue with a foreign power for the general purpose of "aiding its
activities against France."
75. C.P. § 76.
76. C.P. §§ 76, 78.
77. C.P. § 76.
78. Report of M. Dumesnil de Gramont, Chairman of the Commission of Leg. and
Reform. JouxL OrIcna, DEBATS, No. 57/58, 148-151 (1944).
79. Ordinance of June 26, 1944; (1944) CoLLT ioN Co a'.a 356.
80. C.P. §327.
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orders was substantially modified.8 ' Any acts committed in obedience to
the laws and decrees of the Vichy government by those Frenchmen who
held leading administrative or executive positions or who by their own per-
sonal initiative could have avoided the execution of such laws or orders were
specifically excepted from the superior order doctrine. Nor could the de-
fense be invoked by those who had denounced persons to the enemy, com-
mitted individual acts of violence, or willfully delivered material, documents
or information to the enemy.
8 2
Procedure. Under the French constitutional laws of 1875,8a all treason in-
dictments brought against high government officials were required to be tried
by the Senate sitting as a High Court of Justice; where similar indictments
were brought against ordinary citizens, the jurisdiction of the High Court of
Justice was not mandatory and the government could in its discretion provide
that the accused be tried by regular criminal courts.
Upon the liberation of North Africa in 1943, it was determined to utilize
military courts for the trial of collaborators until the ordinary criminal courts
could be reconstituted. However, in November, 1944, the government, yield-
ing to demands for a swifter mode of trial and for representation of the re-
sistance elements in the courts, s4 established a High Court of Justice to try
all government officials attached to the Vichy government during the period
from June 17, 1940 to the date of liberation,8 5 and special "courts of justice"
to try all nongovernmental persons charged with violations of the French
penal code whenever there was evidence of an intent to aid any enemy un-
dertaking.8 6 The jurisdiction of these courts was not restricted to violations
of the treason provisions alone but extended to any unlawful act committed
with intent to aid the enemy.
The High Court of Justice was composed of two judicial officers plus 24
jurors selected from two lists drawn up by the Provisional Consultative As-
81. It is interesting to note that in April, 1944, Great Britain made a similar modi-
fication of the doctrine of superior orders in regard to violations of the rules of warfare
committed pursuant to an order. BRITISH MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW f1443, cited in
60 L. Q. Rzv. 225-6 (1944); note support of this modification in British parliamentary
debates on war criminals, 130 H. L. DE. 120, 130 (5th ser. 1943) ; 133 H. L. DEn. 283-4
(5th ser. 1944).
82. Ordinance of June 26, 1944, § 3, (1944) CoLLEcriox Comm=ava 356.
83. Constitutional Law on the Relations of the Public Powers, July 16, 1875, § 12,
cited in RAo, op. cit. sq'ra note 57, at 470; for discussion of this provision, see EsMmx,
ALMENTS DE DaOIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 1054-66 (1914).
84. These demands were vigorously urged in the early debates which took place in
North Africa over the slowness with which the trials of Pucheu and other collaborators
were proceeding. Opinion differed as to whether military tribunals were adequate or
whether special courts should be created. At that time the De Gaulle government was
opposed to the creation of special courts, SUPPLAMENT AU JOURNAL OFFicumI,, D nATS,
No. 6, pp. 1-12 (Jan. 15, 1944), and No. 23, pp. 5-7 (March 16, 1944).
85. Ordinance of Nov. 28, 1944, (1944) CoLLEcTioN CoMPLET 488,
86. Ordinance of Nov. 18, 1944, Id. at 481.
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sembly, the first list to consist of 50 Senators or Deputies who bad been in
office September 1, 1939 and the second list of persons outside this category as
selected by the Assembly.sr Special "courts of justice" were composed of
a presiding officer selected from among the French judiciary and four jurors
chosen by a commission composed of members of the French judiciary and
the Departmental Committees of Liberation." The establishment of these
courts was not regarded as an infringement of the principle of non-retroac-
tivity which was deemed to be applicable only to substantive penal legisla-
tion.s Nor would their quasi-political character appear to be at variance with
the French concept of treason as essentially a political crime triable by a
political body. 0
However, the government had regarded the composition of the special
courts of justice as a temporary expedient necessitated by the conditions pre-
vailing in France after her liberation. Accordingly in 1945, an amendment to
the November decree was passed assimilating the procedure of juror selec-
tion for these courts to that utilized in the regular criminal courts although
no change was made in the number of jurors selected. 1 Charges of bias and
prejudice on the part of the judges and jurors of the High Court of JusticeO
as well as the establishment in France of a regularly elected Senate and As-
sembly led to similar changes in the High Court as a result of which the pre-
siding officials were elected by the Assembly and the jurors selected from a
panel of 96 Deputies.
93
87. Ibid. § 2.
88. Ordinance of Nov. 28, 1944, §9, (1944) CoLLECTioN Comwpi; 4'S.
89. See statement of M. de Menthon, ioumpar. OFrCM1, D Trs, No. 57/58, 151
(July 21, 1944).
90. Es w, loc. cit. supra note 83.
91. The membership of the commissions selecting the jurors for the courts of justice
was changed to comprise representatives of the departmental general councils instead of
the national liberation committees. Since the liberation committees were in many areas
dissolved, and since, as a result of the elections, the general councils were functioning
again in France, the change vas felt to constitute a6 step in the gradual return of France
to normalcy. A, Communist proposal which would have required the consent of the
liberation committees to the juror nominations vras defeated 19-10 with two abstentions.
JoumRM.L OFricnm, Dku As, No. 13, p. 220 (Dec. 14, 1945).
92. The conduct of the Laval trial, in which the accused was twuice e:zpclled from
the court room for the uproar which he caused among the jurors and the judge, vas
described by the press as deplorable and was reported to have stimulated the government
to revise the composition of the High Court. Le Monde (Paris), Oct. 6, 9, 11, 1945;
N. Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1945, p. 9, col. 4. See also JourzAx. Orrxcnm, Dthrs, No. 13,
pp. 218-21, (Dec. 13, 1945).
93. So reported in The Times (London), Dec. 29, 1945, p. 3; see also N. Y. Times,
Dec. 28, 1945, p. 9, col. 4. In Aug., 1945, after the acquittal of Pierre Flandin, the Com-
munist members of the jury resigned in protest against the ineffectiveness of the court.
A Communist reform bill, proposing the abolition of all judicial representatives on the
bench, and public instead of private deliberations and vote of the court, w,-as rejected
by a vote of 430-142. Le Monde (Paris), Aug. 10, 1946, p. 3; N. Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1946,
p. 6, coL 3; P.M., Aug. 1, 1946, p. 7, col. 1.
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The procedure adopted by the High Court and the special courts of justice
involves several substantial modifications of that ordinarily followed by
French criminal courts.94 In the High Court of Justice, the functions of the
juge d'instruction and the chambre d'accusation were performed by a single
commission composed of five judicial officers nominated by the Minister of
Justice and the Assembly and of six non-judicial representatives selected by
the Assembly.05 No appeal was permitted from the decisions of the Commis-
sion.9 6 The trial procedure before the High Court was similar to that gen-
erally followed in criminal trials with the important exception that the new
law provided that the judge and jury should deliberate together on the guilt of
the defendant.97  No appeal as of right was granted. 8
In the special courts of justice, the proceedings before the chambrc d'ac-
cusation were omitted entirely99 and although the right to appeal from the
interlocutory judgment of the juge d'instruction was not abolished, only the
chief prosecutor (procureur g~n~rale) was entitled to exercise it.100 At the
trial the procedure followed was similar to the High Court with the same cu-
rious provision with respect to the deliberations of the judge and jury,101
The accused was granted 24 hours in which to appeal from the final judgment
of the court, but new trials were to be ordered only for errors of law which
were regarded as prejudicial to the essential rights of the defense,'"0
Treason Trials. The French Minister of Justice announced that as of
July 1, 1946, the French purge courts had considered 125,000 cases involving
various acts of collaboration. 0 3 Of this group well over 5,000 were charged
94. French criminal procedure is divided into three stages: a preliminary investiga-
tion of the evidence before a single magistrate known as the juge dinstruclion (a pro-
ceeding without counterpart in Anglo-American procedure), an ex parle examination of
the indictment before the chanbre d'accusation, which is a proceeding analogous to the
Grand Jury, and finally the trial conducted before a single judge and twelve jurors. Ap-
peals (appel) from the interloctitory judgments of the juge d'intructim may be taken
by the government or the complaining witness (parlie civile) and both the accused and
the prosecution. may appeal (pouvoir en cassation) from the judgments of the chanbre
d'accusation and of the court conducting the trial. In the latter cases, a successful appeal
by the accused can only result in a new trial; in the case of an appeal by the prosecu-
tion from a judgment of acquittal, the disposition of the appeal has no effect on the
judgment and is allowed solely to permit the correction of rulings of law which might
otherwise create unfortunate precedents. For a description and analysis of French crim-
inal procedure, see LA ViE JuRiDiQuE DES PEUPLES, FRANcE, No. 3, 131-42 (Ullmann
and Mirkine-Guetzivitch eds. 1933).
95. Ordinance of Nov. 18, 1944, Arts. 6-9, (1944) CoLLECIoN COMPLETE 481.
96. Id., Art. 9.
97. Id., Art. 10.
98. The accused, however, can petition for extensive clemency. Ibid,
99. Ordinance of Nov. 28, 1944, Tit. 3, (1944) CoLLxcrboN COMPLETE 488.
100. Ordinance of Nov. 18, 1944, Art. 17, (1944) COLLECaOr COMPLETE 481.
101. Id., Art. 51.
102. Id., Art. 66.
103. Statement of M. Teitgen, reported in EXTINFOR, PAGES oF FRANcE, No. 1413
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solely with treason. The trials were conducted on the premise that a state of
war continued to exist between Germany and France despite the armistice
and that Germany therefore constituted an enemy power within the meaning
of the treason statutes. 0 4 The issues raised at the trials centered primarily
on the amount of responsibility to be attached to individual defendants for the
acts of their subordinates, on the extent to which the plea of superior orders
would be permitted by way of defense, and finally on the degree to which the
motives or intentions of the defendants would be weighed by the court in
assessing guilt and sentence.
The trials of Vichy officials proceeded on a theory of treason which looked
not solely to the act or intent of the defendant but rather to the effect of this
act upon the national interests. In the trial of Marshal Petain,oa for exam-
pie, the prosecution charged that the treason of the accused lay in his
definitive acceptance of defeat, in the humiliation of France before the world
by virtue of the institution of a Nazi-like regime, and finally in the loss of
French honor which resulted from Petain's aid to the enemy.leo Petain con-
tended that his actions were motivated solely by his desire to save French in-
dependence and thus contribute an indirect aid to the Allies,07 but the court
ignored this claim and held that in fact Petain's policy resulted in direct aid
to the Germans while its contribution to the Allied cause was at most of
uncertain value. Of greater importance, the court pointed out, was the fact
(Publication of French Press and Information Service, New York, Sept., 1946). The
purge courts established in France had jurisdiction over all acts which were committed
with intent to assist the enemy even though these acts did not constitute treason. The
overall figures given by Mr. Teitgen do not distinguish between those which involved
treason and those which did not. M. Teitgen stated that the number of death sentences
imposed totalled 5,000 and that 29,000 cases involved penalties ranging from penal servi-
tude for life to short term imprisonment. For this reason, the figure of 5,C00 may be
said to represent the minimum of treason cases tried.
104. This issue was raised by the defense in the trial of Georges Suarez, see note 116
infra. Defense counsel maintained that France and Germany were not legally at var
and that after the armistice, Germany vas at most a foreign pov. er within the meaning
of the treason statutes. The court rejected the argument, and stated that a state of war
existed and that the armistice constituted merely a suspension of hostilities. Le Figaro
(Paris), Oct. 24, 1944, pp. 1-2.
105. The complete stenographic report of the Petain trial is contained in ficuL,
LE PRocks Du M cAnrHAL PETIn (Paris, 1946).
106. 2 AtIcHEL, op. cit. supra note 105, at 892-4. This thesis ,as developed at con-
siderable length by the prosecution, id. at 925 et scq. The prosecution made no effort
to represent Petain as "one who had for personal reasons sold his country to the enemy."
Id. at 892.
107. Defense summation is quoted at 2 AMicE.L, op. cit. supra note 105, at 955. De-
fense also claimed that Petain could not be held responsible for the policies of his minis-
ters, over whom he had no control. The court denied the validity of this claim, pointing
out that as Chief of State, Petain had assumed legal responsibility for their acts and
that it was on his own initiative that many of these ministers had been appointed. 2 id.
at 1117.
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that the policy deceived not only the Allies, but also many Frenchmen who
in good faith believed it was their duty to abandon the Allied cause and par-
ticipate in the collaboration with Germany. Therefore, the court concluded,
Petain was clearly guilty of "intelligence" with the enemy, although it ex-
onerated him from the charge of having plotted against the internal security
of the counfry.
This same concept of treason was applied in the trials of Admiral Esteva,108
Resident-general of Tunisia, and General Dentz,10 9 High Commissioner of
the Levant States, the courts rejecting in both cases the defense that each had
acted solely in pursuance of Vichy orders. The prosecution in the trial of
Esteva maintained that "collaboration to the extent to which Esteva carried
it or even the mere appearance of collaboration was a crime because it allowed
the world to think that France was truly collaborating and to believe that
all Frenchmen approved of such a policy."" 0 Esteva was found guilty of
treason but received a life imprisonment sentence instead of death because
of the assistance which he had rendered to French patriots and to American
Consul Doolittle at the time of the German invasion.' 1  In the trial of Gen-
eral Dentz," 2 the accused based his defense on a portrayal of the disastrous
consequences which disobedience of Vichy orders would have entailed for
French interests in the Middle East. " However the court held that this de-
fense did not justify Dentz's actions in firing on Allied and Free French
forces in Syria, and found him guilty of treason.
Subsequent trials of Vichy Ministers,'" however, indicate that the High
108. The indictment against Esteva is summarized in Le Monde (Paris), March 14,
1945, p. 2; in general the criminal acts on which the charges were based included his
sending of food to Rommel's Afrika Korps in Lybia, recruitment of laborers for work
in Germany, his failure to resist German demands in Tunisia, his agreement with the
Germans to place at their disposal all necessary facilities for their fight against the
Allied invasion forces, and finally his failure to order resistance to the German landings
in North Africa after the Allied invasion. The documentary evidence on which these
charges were based is collected in part in Ministare de L'Information, Le Procts do
L'Admiral Esteva, NoTEs, DoCumrNTAmEs Er P-TDzs, No. 33, March 10, 1946.
109. The indictments and proceedings of the trial of General Dentz were fully re-
ported in Le Monde (Paris). For summary of the indictment see Le Monde (Paris),
April 19, 1945, p. 2. Dentz was charged primarily with furnishing the enemy forces with
military facilities in Syria and with firing on British and Free French forces in obe-
dience to Vichy orders.
110. Le Monde (Paris), March 16, 1946, p. 2. At the time of the invasion of North
Africa, the prosecution argued, the fatality of Petain's policy to French interests was
obvious to all Frenchmen and none could in good faith have been deceived by it,
111. The decision of the court is summarized in Le Monde (Paris), March 17, 1945,
p.2.
112. For a report of the daily proceedings, see Le Monde (Paris), April 21, 1945,
p. 3; id., April 22/23, 1945, p. 2, Dentz' death sentence was commuted to life imprison-
ment by General de Gaulle and two months later he died of a heart attack. N. Y. Times,
Oct. 18, 1945; The Times (London), Dec. 14, 1945, p. 5, col. 3.
113. Among the Vichy ministers convicted of treason was Raphael Alibert, Minister
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Court of Justice has limited in part the broad implications of these earlier de-
cisions. Factors which have included their length of service as Minister, the
degree of their responsibility for the adoption of the policies which they
executed, the manner in which they administered these policies, and finally
their role, if any, in the Resistance have been considered by the court in
mitigation of the punishment for the crime.1 4
One of the major grbups of defendants indicted for treason before the
specially created courts of justice involved those Frenchmen who through
their writings or broadcasts had exhibited either pro-German or anti-Allied
sympathies or who had supported the internal policies of Vichy. The charges
brought against these persons were either intelligence with the enemy or de-
moralization of the nation.
The first of these trials involved the defendant, Georges Suarez, 5 charged
with intelligence with the enemy for his pro-Nazi pro-Vichy editorial policy
in the news weeklies Anjourd'hui and Paris Soir. Suarez had been appointed
editor of Aujourdhui by Otto Abetz, German ambassador to Vichy, at a
monthly salary of $1600. The court, rejecting Suarez's claim that his edi-
torial policies were not pro-German but merely supported law and order and
that throughout the occupation he had acted in good faith though perhaps
mistakenly, found him guilty of intelligence with the enemy and sentenced
him to death.116
The basis for the conviction of Suarez was considerably broadened in sub-
sequent trials. Similar convictions were secured against the editors of the
Paris weekly, .e Suis Partout,lU an independent paper whose personnel were
of Justice, who was charged with framing Vichy's fascist constitution and anti-semitic
laws and with imposing death sentences upon leading De Gaullists, N. Y. Times, March
8, 1947, p. 5, col. 1; Fernand de Brinon, French diplomatic representative in Germany,
who admitted favoring a rapprochement with Germany, and was sentenced to death
although the court conceded that he had rendered valuable services to the Resistance by
obtaining the release of Frenchmen arrested by the Germans. N. Y. Times, March 7, 1947,
p. 7, col. 3; Rene Bonnefoy, Minister of Information, charged with having given in-
structions to the press pursuant to Laval's orders which were systematically hostile to the
Allies and to the Resistance movement. A. F. P., Paris, July 18, 1946; and Hubert
Lagardelle, Minister of Labor, condemned for his enthusiastic support and execution of
the Vichy labor policies which resulted in the deportation of French workers to Ger-
many. Le Monde (Paris), July 16, 19, 1945.
114. Pierre Etienne Flandin, Vichy Foreign Minister for 56 days, was acquitted of
treason and received a suspended sentence of five years national indignity. Le Monde
(Paris), July 23 and 28/29, 1946; Jean Bertholet, Minister of Communications, received
a two year prison term and ten years national indignity. Le Monde (Paris), July 11,
12, 1946. The importance of these factors was also brought out in the trial of Lagardelle, Le
Monde (Paris), July 16, 19, 1945.
115. Indictment summarized in Le Figaro (Paris), Oct. 22/23, 1944, p. 1.
116. Le Figaro (Paris), Oct. 24, 1944, pp. 1-2.
117. In November, 1946, six editor-owners of this paper were placed on trial. Three
were tried in absentia. The proceedings of the trial are summarized by Le Monde (Paris),
Nov. 16, 17, and 26, 1946.
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not in the employ of Germany and whose editorial policies during the oc-
cupation had continued along the same ideological lines which had caused it
to advocate pacifism and authoritarian government prior to the defeat of
France. The defendants maintained that many of the allegedly traitorous ar-
ticles were mere news dissemination and reflected no personal opinions, that
others were written under duress and finally, that their support of a strong
government in France was motivated solely by their belief in law and order.
The court, however, rejected these defenses and found the defendants guilty
of treason.' 18
Subsequent trials which have involved editors,"
9 free lance contributors,'12 0
-authors,'2 1 cartoonists, 1 22 radio script writers and broadcasters 123 indicate
clearly the futility of defenses based upon absence of intent to injure France,
upon the right of free speech,124 lack of personal gain, 2 5 or upon prior politi-
118. Two were condemned to death. One received life imprisonment. Le Monde
(Paris), Nov. 26, 1946, p. 6.
119. Rene Benedetti, former chief editor of Marcel Deat's paper, L'Oeuvre (Paris),
sentenced to life imprisonment. L'Oeuvre was conspicuously anti-Russian and pro Franco-
German alliance, advocating in addition the defense of the French empire against attacks
of the Allies. Reuters, Paris, March 2, 1943 (OWI, Eu R PEAN Nmvs DIGVST). See also
trial of Lucien Combelle, owner of weekly newspaper, National Review, N. Y. Times,
Dec. 24, 1944; of Robert Perrier, managing editor of L'Auto and Aujourd'hui, N. Y.
Herald Tribune, April 17, 1945, p. 3, col. 5.
120. See trials of Robert de Beauplan, editorial writer for Illustration and Le Main,
and formerly a university professor, Le Monde (Paris), Nov. 27, 1945, p. 4; and of Guy
Crouzet, editorial writer for Nouveau Temps, Le Monde (Paris), Jan. 18, 1947, p. 8.
121. This group included Charles Maurras, noted French royalist, Abel Hermant, a
member of the French Academy, Henri Beraud, noted anti-British author, and Robert
Brassilach, French novelist and historian. Maurras and Hermant received life imprison-
ment, while the latter two were sentenced to death.
122. Raphael Souphault, cartoonist for L'Action Francaise and Je Suis Partout, was
sentenced to fifteen years penal servitude for his criticism of de Gaulle and his ridicule
of the members of the resistance. A.F.P., Paris, Jan. 30, 31, 1947.
123. The trials of these persons reveal a wide discrepancy in sentences. Paul Ferdonnet,
who had emigrated to Germany in 1927 and who maintained that he merely translated
newscasts without broadcasting himself, was sentenced to death. N. Y. Herald Tribune,
July 12, 1945, p. 3, col. 8. Francois de Vibraye, announcer for the Paris radio at a
monthly salary of $144 (paid by the German Embassy) received a ten year prison sen-
tence. N. Y. Herald Tribune, Nov. 8, 1944, p. 14, col. 4. Jean-Herold Paquis, radio an-
nouncer who admitted his allegiance to the Germans, was sentenced to death. N. Y.
Times, Sept.18, 1945, p. 9, col. 6. Andre Algerron, director of the German controlled
radio station, Radio Patrie, was condemned to death for operating the station as an
auxiliary of the enemy propaganda service and for insulting members of the Resistance.
A.F.P., Paris, Nov. 27, 1946.
124. This defense was expressly raised by Henri Beraud, but the court maintained that
Beraud was being tried for his propaganda and not for his opinions and therefore held
the defense inapplicable. N. Y. Herald Tribune, Dec. 30, 1944, p. 3, col. I.
125. Le Monde (Paris), Nov. 16, 17, and 26, 1946. Similarly the defense offered by
Abel Hermant that he was compelled to write allegedly propagandist material in order
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cal convictions long antedating the defeat of France.121 In general it has
been sufficient to sustain convictions if evidence existed of anti-Allied senti-
ments or support for Vichy policies.
The other major category of defendants tried for treason by the special
courts of justice included those persons who had, in one capacity or another,
either public or private, taken part in the denunciations of patriots to the
Gestapo or to the Vichy government, who had committed acts of violence
towards these persons, who were responsible for their arrest, or who had en-
gaged in other acts resulting in deportation of these persons to Germany. '
These defendants were primarily police officials,'" 8 members of the Militia,lca
agents of the Gestapo1 30 and other civil servants of the Vichy government.2
3 '
to eat was not considered apparently as a sufficient defense to vrarrant acquittal or re-
duction of sentence. A.F.P., Paris, Dec. 15, 1945.
126. This defense was raised by Charles Maurras who vas vell known since World
War I for his advocacy of authoritarian government. At his trial he maintained that
he had always been true to his political beliefs and that he had not capitalized financially
on his writings. N. Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1945, p. 13, col. 5; see note 122 stspra.
127. Although the names of 64 economic collaborators were sent by the Minister
of National Economy to the Minister of Justice for investigation, few of these were
even brought to trial. The report of the Minister of National Economy is summarized
in Le Figaro (Paris), Oct. 4, 1944, p. 2; the only trials reported involved Andrew
Marquer, textile manufacturer who received 20 years penal servitude for trafficking with
the enemy, N. Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1945, p. 3, col. 4; id. Oct. 20, 1945, p. 4, col. 6;
and M. Berliet, head of the Berliet Automobile Works who received a two year imprison-
ment sentence for having put his factories to work for Germany and having assisted in
the drive to obtain workers for Germany. N. Y. Times, June 9, 1946, p. 29, col. 2. The
investigation of Louis Renault on similar charges before the examining magistrate vas
reported in Le Figaro (Paris'), Sept. 24/25, 1944, p. 2, but no indication of further pro-
ceedings has been found in the French Press.
Very few members of the legal profession were brought to trial although it vas as-
serted in the Provisional Consultative Assembly that many of these persons had been
involved in collaborationist activities. JouanAL. OFFcIzL, DL.AS, No. 69, p. 1705 (Aug.
2, 1945).
128. This group included former Prefect of Police, Amadee Bussiere, who was con-
demned to penal servitude for life for similar acts. Le Monde (Paris), April 11, 1945,
p. 3. Lt. Jean Giot, Vichy policeman who had fought with the French Liberation Army
under Leclerc, was sentenced to death for having assisted in the execution or deportation
of French resistance workers in pre-liberation days. N. Y. Herald Tribune, Dec. 29, 1945,
p. 9, col. 3.
129. The trial and conviction of Joseph Darnaud, head of the militia, on charges of
intelligence with the enemy was the outstanding case in this group. Darnaud's chief de-
fense was that as a member of the armed forces, it was his duty to obey the orders of
Petain, his chief. This defense w.as rejected by the court and Darnaud sentenced to death.
Le Monde (Paris), Oct. 5, 1945, p. 2.
130. There were numerous reported trials of individuals who, as Gestapo agents, had
denounced patriots and engaged in similar activities. Perhaps the most important trial
involved 24 persons who were known as the "Brigade of Angels". Of these nine were
sentenced to death and fifteen received varying terms of imprisonment. Le Monde (Paris),
Dec. 8/9, 1946, p. 8.
131. One of the first acts of Petain was to order the dissolution of the secret societies,
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Proof that the arrest or denunciation was actually committed by the de-
fendant personally or by one of his subordinates18 2 was sufficient to secure
conviction irrespective of whether he acted pursuant to orders.
The conduct of the collaboration trials has been sharply attacked by both
the Right and Left in France.183 Rightist critics charged the courts with
partiality, with violating the rights of the defendants, and with the imposi-
tion of disproportionately heavy sentences024  Government attempts to rem-
edy these defects in the purge machinery, 8 5 however, were opposed by Leftist
groups who regarded the trials as too slow and ineffective, the verdicts as
too lenient, and the government use of its right of pardon as an unwarranted
interference in the administration of justice.13  While many factors un-
doubtedly motivated these criticisms, it would appear that the conduct of the
trials by the quasi-political courts has contributed in part to the general dis-
satisfaction and has failed to engender a spirit of popular confidence in its
decisions.
notably the Freemasons. A Service of Research was created to carry out this program
under the direction of Bernard Fay, former professor of the Collige de France. Fay, to-
gether with five associates was put on trial on charges of intelligence with the enemy
for his activities in connection with this service which was alleged to have been respon-
sible for the denunciation of some 6,000 Freemasons, the deportation of 989 and the
execution of 549. Fay defended on the ground that his duty was merely to classify and
publish documents relating to Freemasons and that it was purely intellectual rather
than political. The defendants, however, were found guilty and received varying prison
terms from penal servitude for life to five years. Le Monde (Paris), Nov. 28, 1946; id,,
Dec. 7, 1946, p. 4; see also A.F.P., Paris, Nov. 25, 1946.
132. This doctrine of "negative responsibility" was successfully invoked by the
United States in its prosecution of the Japanese war criminals in the Philippines,
N. Y. Times, May 5, 1947, p. 13, col. 3.
'133. Although originally in the minority those who advocated restraint and objected
to the punishment of those who had acted in good faith or from a sense of misguided
patriotism gradually came to speak for the majority. See SUPPLMENT AU JOURNAL
OFFIcIE, DI ATs, No. 6, pp. 1-12 (Jan. 15, 1944), and No. 23, pp. 5-7 (March 16,
1944); also JOURNAL OFIcn, DEBATS, No. 13, pp. 218-21 (Dec. 14, 1945). See also
newspaper account of the Laval trial which aroused criticism from almost every element
in the French population; see note 92 supra.
134. Garcon, Some Aspects of the Problem of the Purge in France, FRatci PRESS
AND INFOMATION SERVICa, Sdr. III, No. 184 E, Dec. 21, 1944; and Leroum, Problems
of the Purge, FxE FRANcE, VII, No. 5, p. 251 (March 1, 1945).
135. See notes 91-3 supra. Official Swiss protests against the summary conviction
of Swiss citizens on charges of collaboration without proof and without legal cause were
acknowledged by the French government and admitted to be well founded. The French
government appointed a special oflcial in the Ministry of Justice to study the problei but
according to Swiss reports, the problem is still unsettled. Journal de Geudve (Geneva),
Feb. 25, 1947, No. 47.
1 136. Farmer, France before the Problem of Political Justice, in EXTINFOR, PAGES D
FaAxcF, No. 7413 (Sept., 1946).
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Perhaps the chief significance of the French trials lies in the concept of
treason which was developed by the courts-a concept which does not necessi-
tate a showing of specific intent to assist the enemy but merely requires proof
of the commission of acts which result in aid to the enemy or are considered
contrary to the national interest. While such a concept was not unknown to
French law and in fact does serve to protect the security of the state, it would
seem to ignore the historic safeguards written into the law of treason to pro-
tect citizens from political oppression or popular passion. In this respect it
appears to run contrary to the spirit of the French penal code provisions.237
CONCLUSION
In the postwar period Anglo-American and European countries were faced
with the problem of implementing an immediate policy goal---satisfying the
demands of an outraged population for punishment of persons regarded as
criminals-without doing violence to traditional legal doctrine. The relative
values placed on these conflicting legal and political policy goals substantially
accounts for the varying treatment accorded collaborators in the different
European communities.
The modification of trial procedures and the substantive changes in the
treason laws to cover propaganda activities which were instituted in Great
Britain and Switzerland do not appear to have caused serious difficulties
with respect to the actual trials nor to have evoked popular criticism. In
France, on the other hand, the exigencies of the situation demanded more
drastic modifications both in the customary trial procedures and in the tra-
ditional doctrines of intent and non-retroactive legislation. Although France
attempted to avoid an infringement of the principle of non-retroactivity
through the use of "interpretive" provisions, it is clear that the French trials
proceeded on a theory of criminality which was in fact retroactive in nature
regardless of the name attached to it.
. While the theory of retroactive justice is normally abhorrent to cilized
countries, strict adherence to the doctrine of non-retroactivity would have
seriously impeded effective action against many of the defendants in the
collaborationist trials. The trials, therefore, cannot be evaluated solely in
terms of the justice or injustice of the result to the defendants. Nor can
criticism of the establishmenf of quasi-political courts, the issuance of "in-
terpretive" provisions, the relaxation of intent requirements, or the outlawing
of particular defenses be rested solely upon the framework of legal precedent.
To do so would be to ignore the bitterness which survived hostilities and
the exigencies of a highly charged political situation.
137. These provisions had sought to protect the citizens from political oppression by
delimiting the crime of treason into specific acts engaged in for specific purposes; protec-
tion by this means would not seem to be possible under the new concept in view of the
difficulties of defining the crime in precise terms before its commission, and of the sus-
ceptibility of the criterion of national interest to differing judgments in different periods
of time.
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